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CONTROLLING STATUTE 
U.C.A. § 10-2-414 provides in part that: 
Before annexing unincorporated territory having more than 
five acres, a municipality shall. . . . adopt a policy 
declaration with regard to annexation. 
* * * 
Before adopting the policy declaration the governing body 
shall hold a public hearing thereon. At least 30 days prior 
to any hearing, notice of the time and place of such hearing 
and the location where the draft policy circulation is 
available for review shall be published in a newspaper of 
general circulation in the area proposed for expansion 
except that when there are 25 or fewer residents or property 
owners within the affected territory, mailed notice may be 
given to each affected resident or owner. . . . 
iii 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE REGARDING 
SANDY CITY'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
Contrary to Sandy City's assertion at page 2 of its brief, Mesa's objection to 
the annexation proceedings is based upon Sandy City's total failure to provide notice, 
as mandated by U.C.A. § 10-2-414, of "where the draft policy declaration [for the 
annexation] is available for review" at least 30 days prior to the adoption of the 
policy declaration. 
In response to the numbered paragraphs in the Statement of Facts, Mesa 
Development responds as follows: 
1. Whether or not Mesa Corporation "resided" in the annexed area is an 
issue of law. Mesa acknowledges that it did not have its principal place of business 
within the annexed territory. 
2. Sandy City's reliance upon the 1979 annexation policy declaration in 
paragraph 2 of its Statement of Facts is a tacit admission that no policy declaration 
was properly adopted (U.C.A. § 10-2-414) either prior to or at the time of the 
Coulter/LDS Church annexation that is challenged in this action. 
6. Even though the Sandy Planning Commission initially recommended 
annexation in October (R. 100), the annexation petition was subsequently lumped with 
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additional parcels and the total property annexed in the Coulter/LDS Church 
Annexation Ordinance was in 10.55 acres. (R.79-81). 
7. Even though the November 16,1993 notice, as described in the affidavit 
of the Sandy City employee (R.59, 60) makes reference to a proposed policy 
declaration, the proposed declaration itself has never been disclosed or revealed by 
Sandy City. In addition, there is no support in the record, and indeed no claim is 
made by Sandy City, that the notices sent to property owners made any reference to 
the proposed policy declaration. (R.60). The November 4, 1993 notice published in 
the Greensheet contained no reference to the draft policy declaration. 
8. At the December 7,1993 city council meeting, Mr. Shaw made reference 
to "the actual annexation policy declaration which we're required by state law to file 
with the County Boundary Commission...". (R.101). There is nothing to suggest 
that this was a draft policy declaration as required by statute. In fact, at least one 
copy of the final declaration is dated November 15, 1993 (R.32). There is also no 
indication in those transcribed proceedings that there had been any notice to the 
public of the availability of the proposed draft policy declaration as required by 
U.C.A. § 10-2-414. 
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10. While it is true that the property annexed included property from several 
different petitions, a single ordinance was passed accepting all of the 10.55 acres at 
one time. (R.79). The property annexed exceeded five acres. 
12. Contrary to Sandy City's assertion, Mesa's objection was that the notice 
which was given did not provide at least 30 days notice of the location where the 
draft policy declaration was available for public review as required by law. The 
Complaint alleged that Mesa was the owner of real property within the affected area. 
(R.2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because the annexation ordinance at issue exceeded five acres in area, Sandy 
City was obligated by U.C.A. § 10-2-414 to prepare a draft policy declaration, give 
published notice of its availability, and give notice of a hearing on the draft, all prior 
to adopting the annexation ordinance. Sandy did none of these things, and as a result 
the ordinance is invalid. 
The disconnection statute does not apply to this case because the annexation 
ordinance was invalid. See Chevron USA. Inc. v. City of North Salt Lake, 711 P.2d 
228 (Utah 1985). 
Mesa has standing to challenge the ordinance because it is an affected property 
owner. Individual property owners can challenge annexation proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COULTER/LDS CHURCH 
ANNEXATION ORDINANCE IS INVALID. 
The threshold issue on appeal is whether or not the annexation ordinance can 
stand in the face of the procedural deficiencies which exist. 
A. The annexation was of sufficient size to require a policy declaration, 
Sandy City argues (p. 12) that because Mesa's property was 3.89 acres in size, that 
U.C.A. § 10-2-414 does not apply to Mesa's parcel. It was undisputed, however, that 
the total property annexed by the ordinance contained 10.55 acres (Ordinance No. 93-
60, R.79). 
The trial court found that "Sandy's notice of the annexation proceedings did 
not specify a place where policy declaration would be available for public 
inspection." (R.226) Sandy City has not attacked this finding. 
The statute at issue, U.C.A. § 10-2-414 provides in relevant part that: 
Before annexing unincorporated territory having more than 
five acres, a municipality shall, on its own initiative, on 
recommendation of its planning commission, or in 
response to an initiated petition by real property owners as 
provided by law... adopt a policy declaration with regard 
to annexation. 
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As discussed in the December 7, 1993 city council minutes, Sandy City 
determined to consolidate several petitions. (R.lOl) Having made the decision to 
annex a parcel in excess of five acres, Sandy City took upon itself the obligation to 
properly adopt a policy declaration with regard to the annexation. Without 
identifying any support from any case or statute, Sandy City argues that because 
Mesa's parcel was less than five acres, even though it was included in an annexation 
ordinance which included over ten acres, that Sandy was entitled to ignore the 
requirements of § 10-2-414 regarding the draft policy declaration. 
There is nothing in U.C.A. § 10-2-414 to support the argument that the 
statutory requirement is to be applied as Sandy City beckons. Indeed, the statute 
mandates that the municipality " . . . shall adopt a policy declaration with regard to the 
annexation. . ." after notice of and after a hearing on the draft policy declaration. 
In U.C.A. § 10-2-401, et seq. the legislature has mandated that before cities 
annex property in excess of five acres that they analyze, based upon a draft policy 
declaration, the impact the proposed action would have on a number of issues. The 
policy factors enumerated in the annexation statute, U.C.A. § 10-2-401, would be 
frustrated in virtually every annexation if Sandy City's interpretation of the statutory 
scheme were to be adopted. If Sandy City's position were to be adopted, a city could 
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routinely consolidate a number of separate petitions that may potentially include 
hundreds of acres without undertaking the legislatively mandated analysis. This 
analysis process, of which the draft policy declaration is an integral part, is a critical 
precursor of the right given to cities to expand their boundaries. Sandy City asks this 
Court to ignore both the legislative purpose and the clear instruction of U.C.A, § 10-
2-414. 
Sandy City attempts to place the blame for its own procedural deficiencies on 
Mesa's shoulders, arguing a chamber of horrors if the ordinance is struck down. The 
entire annexation process was within Sandy City's control. Sandy City has not even 
attempted to argue that it properly adopted a policy declaration for this 10.55 acre 
annexation. The trial court concluded that the annexation did not comply with the 
statute. (R.227) There was never any public notice that a draft of the proposed policy 
declaration was available for public review prior to any of the hearings as required 
by § 10-2-414. Indeed, none of the notices given by Sandy City in connection with 
the annexation even refer to a draft policy declaration, let alone identify . . . "The 
location where the draft policy declaration is available for review.". There is no 
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evidence that a draft policy declaration ever existed for the Coulter/LDC Church 
annexation.1 
Sandy City makes a half-hearted argument at page 11 of its brief that its 1980 
annexation policy declaration somehow applies to the 1993 annexation ordinance. 
This argument finds absolutely no support in U.C.A. §10-2-414. The Utah Supreme 
Court has specifically rejected such a contention in Paulsen v. Hooper Water 
Improvement District, 656 P.2d 459 (Utah 1982) (revd. on other grounds Pike v. 
Vernal City, 711 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985)). In Paulsen, the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that: 
U.C.A. § 10-2-416 contemplates the adoption by a 
municipality of a specific policy declaration for each new 
area in excess of five acres that is annexed. 
In Paulsen, the Court went on to observe that: 
In addition, § 10-2-414 also requires the adoption of a 
specific policy declaration because the factors listed in § 
10-2-414(2) will necessarily vary for each new area sought 
to be annexed. Moreover, the last paragraph of § 10-2-414 
sets forth an elaborate notice provision with regard to the 
1
 See for example, paragraph 7, page 6 of Sandy City's Statement of Facts. No 
reference is made to the draft policy declaration having been circulated to the public or otherwise 
made available to the public. In that same regard, at page 5, Sandy City contends that a copy of 
the proposed declaration was mailed to potentially affected governmental agencies on November 
16, 1993. (R.32) This is especially curious in light of the alleged existence of a signed policy 
declaration dated November 15, 1993. U.C.A. § 10-2-414 requires that the draft be available at 
least 30 days prior to any hearing on the draft. 
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adoption of a proposed policy declaration. To permit an 
municipality to adopt a single master policy declaration for 
all future annexations of areas in excess of five acres 
would render § 10-2-414(2) and the notice provisions in 
the last paragraph of § 10-2-414 a nullity. 
The law in Utah is well established that a separate specific policy declaration must 
be adopted, after notice and hearing in connection with each annexation that exceeds 
five acres in size. The annexation ordinance here was of 10.55 acres. The statute was 
not complied with and the Coulter/LDS Church Annexation Ordinance, 93-60 is void. 
II. 
MESA IS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH 
DISCONNECTION STANDARDS OR PROCEDURES. 
Sandy City argues (at page 8) that Mesa must seek relief through the 
disconnection statute. If the annexation which is challenged by Mesa were a valid 
annexation, Mesa should be required to pursue disconnection of all or part of the 
property from Sandy City. No legal authority exists to support Sandy City's 
argument that disconnection is the only remedy available where the annexation 
ordinance is invalid. 
In Chevron USA. Inc. v. City of North Salt Lake. 711 P.2d 228 (Utah 1985) the 
Utah Supreme Court specifically observed that disconnection is not the proper 
method to attack an invalid annexation. 
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Annexation and disconnection obviously serve different 
purposes, are effectuated by different statutory procedures, 
and are governed by different criteria. A property owner 
of annexed territory cannot forego the specified legal 
procedure for challenging an annexation and instead resort 
to disconnection procedures because those procedures 
might be more successful for attacking an annexation, (at 
231). 
The Court went on to observe that a failure to challenge the annexation could result 
in an endless circle of litigation. The Chevron case also reaffirms the significance 
of the requirement that municipalities give notice of and hold a public hearing on the 
policy declaration where the annexation exceeds five acres. 
In short, Sandy City's argument that Mesa must pursue deannexation is 
specifically rejected in the Chevron, supra, case. 
III. 
MESA HAS STANDING. 
A. Mesa is a resident within the meaning of the statute. In its opening 
brief, Mesa set forth (pages 13 through 16, inclusive) the reasons why Mesa should 
be considered a "resident" within the annexation statute. As pointed out in Mesa's 
opening brief, the term "resident" is not defined in the annexation statute. 
Additional support for the proposition that the term "resident" as used in the 
annexation statute refers to the property owner is found in U.C.A. § 10-2-423. That 
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provision addresses the subject of "residents" paying property taxes. This reference 
to "residents" as taxpayers further supports Mesa's argument that the annexation 
statute's use of the term "resident" means the property owner. 
The Chevron USA. Inc. case, supra, also speaks of the obligation of the 
"property owner of annexed territory" to challenge the annexation. While standing 
was not an issue in the Chevron case, the Utah Supreme Court's reference to the 
"property owner" as being obligated to attack the annexation lends support to the 
interpretation that it is property owners who are involved in the annexation process. 
Sandy City's argument would mean that the owner of vacant property could never 
challenge the annexation process, even though that owner may have been the 
petitioner, while on the other hand, a renter who merely happens to live in the 
annexed territory could challenge the annexation. This anomaly would not advance 
the annexation process. 
Sandy City next argues that because Mesa had actual notice of the annexation 
proceedings that it lacks standing to attack the irregularity of the proceedings. This 
argument fails for a number of reasons. Initially, the Freeman, infra, decision does 
not support Sandy's argument that Mesa lacks standing. In Freeman v. Centerville 
City. 600 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1979), the plaintiff contended that the annexation statute 
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itself was constitutionally defective because of a deficiency in notice requirements 
within the statute. The Court concluded that the statutory scheme was constitutional 
and that the notice provisions for in the statute did not render it constitutionally 
defective. 
As the Supreme Court observed, there was no claim in Centerville City that the 
city had not complied with the statute. The issue here is not whether the statute was 
invalid, but whether Sandy complied with the statutory notice requirement. The trial 
court concluded that while Sandy did not comply with the notice requirements, that 
it "substantially" complied. (R.227) In West Bountiful City v. Woods Cross City. 
737 P.2d 163 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court of Utah rejected the argument Sandy 
City advances and the trial court accepted. In West Bountiful. Woods Cross was 
given only 19 days notice of a hearing on a proposed policy declaration. (The statute 
then required 20 days notice.) Woods Cross actually attended the hearing, and later 
objected to the annexation based upon the inadequacy of the notice. Even though 
Woods Cross had actual notice and actually attended the hearing, Justice Zimmerman 
concluded that the inadequate notice precluded a finding of substantial compliance 
with the annexation statute by West Bountiful and struck down the challenged 
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annexation ordinance. In this case, Mesa stands in the same position as Woods Cross 
in the West Bountiful case. Mesa has standing. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that a city's failure to strictly 
comply with the notice requirements of the annexation statute renders the annexation 
void, even where the complaining party had actual notice and was present. Paulsen 
v. Hooper Water Improvement District, supra: Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 
993 (Utah 1982); West Bountiful City, supra. Had Sandy City given proper notice 
of the availability of the draft policy declaration and had hearings on it, or had the 
draft proposal even been available for inspection, others may have appeared to object 
to the annexation and to the draft policy declaration. 
IV. 
MESA'S CLAIM DOES NOT VIOLATE 
LEGISLATIVE POLICY. 
Legislative policy regarding annexation is set forth in U.C.A. § 10-2-401. No 
where is it indicated in the statute that municipalities may ignore the notice 
requirements by failing to give notice of the availability of copies of the draft 
policy declaration and notice of hearings on the declaration for annexations in excess 
of five acres. 
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There is nothing within the current annexation statutes that require challenges 
to annexation proceedings to be brought by the attorney general as Sandy City 
suggests at pages 16 and 17 of its brief. In 1979, the Utah Legislature repealed the 
former annexation statutes. Sandy City has not offered this Court any authority under 
the current statutory scheme which supports its position that only the attorney general 
can pursue challenges to an annexation. The Kansas case, Babcock v. Kansas City. 
419 P.2d 882 at 884 (Kansas 1966), relied upon by Sandy City was effectively 
overruled in Kansas by changes in legislation similar to those enacted in Utah in 
1979. See City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe. 620 P.2d 1153 (Kansas 1980) (overruled 
on other grounds, 625 P.2d 423). 
Sandy City's argument is also implicitly rejected in the vast number of post 
1979 Utah cases challenging annexation that were private actions. See for example, 
Chevron v. City of North Salt Lake, supra; Sweetwater Properties v. Town of Alta. 
638 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1981); Szatkowski v. Bountiful City. 906 P.2d 902 (Utah App. 
1995). If no private right of action had existed, it seems likely that the Utah courts 
would have said so by now. 
Sandy City, at various points in its brief, raises a chamber of horrors argument 
that Mesa's action would disenfranchise a number of unsuspecting residents. Mesa 
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was not the cause of the inadequate notice that dooms the ordinance. Mesa did not 
violate the annexation statute. If any fingers are to be pointed, they can be directed 
only at Sandy City. Sandy City has not suggested that it is incapable of attempting 
to defend its own actions. There are no statutory requirements that all of the property 
owners be included in this action. Certainly none have been identified by Sandy City. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed 
and the Coulter/LDS Church Annexation Ordinance, 93-60 should be declared 
invalid. 
DATED this I ( day of May, 1997. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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